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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
LONNIE KIRKLAND MASCIANTONIO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
1 Case No. 920466-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the 
above-entitled Court by provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), U.C.A. 
1953 as amended. 
NATURE OF CASE 
Defendant was convicted of forgery, a second degree 
felony, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Washington 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable James L. Shumate presiding. 
She appeals the order denying her motion to quash and the judgment 
of conviction contending that alleged offense is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
Following the denial of her motion to quash the 
information, Defendant entered a conditional plea of "no contest" 
reseirving the right to appeal the issue relating to the grade of 
the offense. The district court entered judgment, stayed the 
imposition of sentence, and placed Defendant on probation. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Does the forgery of a document purporting to be a receipt 
or acquittance constitute a second degree felony or a class A 
misdemeanor? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The interpretation of a statute presents a question of 
law. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). Utah 
appellate courts review questions of law under a correction of 
error standard with no deference to the trial court. Bellon v. 
Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991); Ward, 798 P„2d at 759. 
See also. State v. Bagshaw, 180 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (CA, 
2/14/92)(Court of Appeals reviewed trial court's interpretation and 
application of U.C.A. 76-3-402 under a correction of error standard 
concluding that trial court erred in failing to reduce defendant's 
convictions to class B misdemeanors). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of all relevant authorities is quoted in the 
body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was charged with forgery, a second degree 
felony, by an information which alleged that the Defendant executed 
a writing purporting to be the act of one Leslie Church, "said 
writing representing an interest in or claim against property, or 
a pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or enterprise" 
(R 1). 
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The State theorized that the Defendant stole money from 
her employer and, in an effort to conceal the resulting cash 
shortage of $227.79, fabricated a receipt purportedly executed by 
Leslie Church acknowledging the receipt of a cash refund paid in 
connection with the return of defective merchandise (T (Preliminary 
Hearing) 10, 12-14, 31-32; State's Exhibit No, 1 (See addendum)). 
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, Defendant 
argued that the State had at best made out probable cause to 
believe that the Defendant was guilty of forgery, a class A 
misdemeanor (R 30, 38-41)• Defendant was bound over for trial on 
the felony charge (R 33-34). 
Upon arraignment, Defendant attacked the information by 
way of a motion to quash contending that the information improperly 
charged the Defendant with the commission of a second degree felony 
(R 36-37, 42-51). In considering Defendant's motion, the district 
judge made the following observations: 
Now, with respect with your motion to quash, 
Mr. Pendleton, the Court specifically takes 
judicial notice of the preliminary hearing as the 
District Judge in the Fifth District. I sat as the 
committing magistrate in this matter. I have a 
clear recollection of the testimony offered by the 
State of Utah at the preliminary hearing in this 
matter, and based upon that testimony at the 
preliminary hearing, which is the evidentiary basis 
for the court's decision on the motion to quash, 
the Court having specifically found its findings of 
fact with respect to that issue, I again reiterate 
in respect to the motion to quash that the forgery, 
which is the subject of this matter and the prior 
focus at the preliminary hearing, the purported 
receipt alleged to have been signed by one Leslie 
Church, acknowledging the payment of $227.79 was 
not a security, revenue[]stamp or other instrument 
in writing issued by the government or agency 
thereof. It was not a check with a face amount of 
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$100 or more, an issue of stock, bond or other 
instrument or writing purporting to represent an 
interest or claim against any property. I do, 
however, find that that particular receipt 
allegedly signed Leslie Church was a document which 
represented a pecuniary interest in or claim 
against the enterpris[e in] question here, which 
happened to be the St. George Radio Shack, which is 
a dba for Coif's Plumbing. 
And with that finding, your motion to quash is 
denied based specifically upon the testimony at the 
preliminary hearing. 
T (Arraignment) 5-6. 
Thereafter, the district court entered a written order 
denying Defendant's motion to quash the information (R 64-65). 
Following the denial of her motion to quash the 
information Defendant, pursuant to a plea agreement and with 
consent of the district court, entered a conditional plea of "no 
contest" reserving the right to appeal the issue relating to the 
grade of the offense (R 54-60; T (Arraignment) 17-18). The 
district court entered judgment, stayed the imposition of sentence, 
and placed Defendant on probation (R 68-71). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Established principles of statutory construction and 
relevant legislative history indicate that a document purporting to 
be a receipt or acquittance is not of the same nature as an issue 
of corporate stock certificates or bonds. Accordingly, the forgery 
of such a document does not fall within the definition of a second 
degree felony. Furthermore, principles of due process of law 
mandate the resolution of any legitimate question regarding the 
grade of an offense in favor of the criminal defendant. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
INDICATE THAT THE SUBJECT OFFENSE IS A CLASS A 
MISDEMEANOR. 
Section 76-6-501, U.C.A. 1953, reads in relevant part as 
follows: 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the 
writing is or purports to be: 
(a) a security, revenue stamp, or any other 
instrument or writing issued by a government, 
or any agency thereof; or 
(b) a check with a face amount of $100 or 
more, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other 
instrument or writing representing an interest 
in or claim against property, or a pecuniary 
interest in or claim against any person or 
enterprise. 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the 
writing is or purports to be a check with a face 
amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a 
class A misdemeanor. 
In construing the language of this statute and in 
ascertaining the meaning of its general terms the rule of ejusdem 
generis applies. The general reference to "any other instrument or 
writing" takes color from and is restricted to instruments and 
writings similar to issues of corporate stock certificates or 
bonds. See generally, 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes §214 (1974). 
In People v. Korsen, 117 Misc. 2d 875, 459 N.Y.S. 2d 380 
(1983), the defendant was convicted of a class E felony and several 
misdemeanors. The prosecutor filed notice of his intent to have 
the defendant sentenced as a "second felony offender" because he 
had previously been convicted of a felony in federal court. The 
applicable New York statute would not allow enhancement of the 
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sentence based upon the prior conviction unless that conviction 
would have been a felony undei: the laws of the state of New York. 
The subject of the federal indictment had been possession 
of counterfeit bank checks. In determining whether or not the 
basis for the federal conviction would have constituted a felony 
under New York law, the court first referred to New York Penal Law 
§170.15: 
A person is guilty of forgery in the first degree 
when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure 
another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a 
written instrument which is or purports to be, or 
which is calculated to become or to represent if 
completed: 
1. Part of an issue of money, stamps, securities 
or other valuable instruments issued by a 
government or governmental instrumentality; or 
2. Part of an issue of stock, bonds or other 
instruments representing interests in or claims 
against a corporate or other organization or its 
property. 
Id. at 381. 
The New York court concluded: 
Clearly, the possession of counterfeit bank checks 
does not meet the requirements of Penal Law 
§170.15(1), which by its terms is limited to 
instruments issued by a government. It is the 
People's position, that counterfeit bank checks of 
an incorporated commercial bank, satisfies the 
requirements of Penal Law §170.15(2), since they 
represent "claims against" a corporation. No case 
is cited which supports said contention. . . . 
While there is no case law interpreting said 
subdivision, Hechtman, Practice Commentaries 
printed after Penal Law §170.15 in McKinney's 
Consolidated Laws states as follows: 
"This first degree crime is, as indicated, 
confined to counterfeiting of money, stamps 
and comparable government issued instruments, 
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and of corporate stock certificates, bonds and 
the like, (cf. former Penal Law §§884(3, 5), 
892)." (emphasis supplied.) 
Thus, at first blush, it seems clear that Penal Law 
§170.15(2) was meant to cover corporate stock 
certificates, bonds and various other items of this 
specific nature, which were not listed ad seriatum in the 
statute. The court finds that this subdivision is 
limited to corporate securities such as stocks and bonds 
that are normally traded on a securities exchange or an 
over-the-counter market and does not include commercial 
instruments such as checks, bank or otherwise. 
Id. at 381-82. 
In the instant case, under the State's theory, 
Defendant's actions were, at worst, an effort to conceal a theft 
through the fabrication of a writing which was not and could not 
have been purchased, traded, negotiated, or otherwise circulated in 
commerce. A person in possession of this document could not use it 
for the purpose of asserting any claim against Radio Shack or 
anyone else. Indeed, the document purports to indicate that a 
claim against Radio Shack had been extinguished by payment. 
The legal significance of the purported receipt lies in 
its availability for use in connection with mounting a defense 
against a claim asserted by Leslie Church (if she exists) arising 
out of her return of defective merchandise (which the State 
contends never occurred). Such a document does not undermine 
public confidence in important symbols of commerce nor does it 
facilitate the perpetration of fraud on a large-scale basis. 
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POINT II 
RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY INDICATES THAT THE 
SUBJECT OFFENSE IS A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR. 
The drafters of the Model Penal Code suggest that the 
common law crime of forgery developed as the result of the fact 
that other common law crimes were inadequate to reach and punish 
certain blameworthy conduct. The drafters also suggest that if 
these inadequacies are remedied through the development of other 
areas of the law, the need for a separate forgery offense is 
diminished. Nevertheless, forgery is 
retained as a separate offense in the Model Code, 
in part because the concept is so embedded in 
statute and popular understanding that legislative 
abolition seems unlikely. Moreover, the special 
danger of forgery as a threat to public confidence 
in important symbols of commerce and as a means of 
perpetrating large-scale fraud is worth 
recognition. There is also the point that the 
offense of forgery should be drafted to redress 
injuries beyond those that would be occasioned by 
conduct amounting to theft. . . . 
The relationship of forgery to theft does have 
relevance, however, to the drafting and grading of 
the forgery offense. The most serious instances of 
forgery will occur in connection with efforts to 
defraud, and it seems clear that a modern forgery 
provision should be drafted to avoid the imposition 
of penalties disproportionate to those authorized 
for fraud. . . . 
Ordinarily, at least, it would be hard to justify 
punishing an employee for forging his employer's 
endorsement on a check for $100 more severely than 
he would be punished for pocketing $100 of his 
employer's cash. This is not to say that forgery 
on a large-scale should not be punished severely, 
just as it would be difficult to contend that other 
large-scale efforts to defraud should not be 
regarded as serious offenses. It is only to say 
that the relationship between forgery and other 
fraudulent schemes should not be ignored in 
designing the coverage and penalty of the law of 
forgery. 
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Model Penal Code §224.1 comment 2, at 284-85 (1980) (footnote 
omitted). 
Section 76-6-501(3), U.C.A. 1953, is comparable to the 
first sentence of Model Penal Code §224.1(2J1. The Model Code 
provision reads: 
Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the 
writing is or purports to be part of an issue of 
money, securities, postage or revenue stamps, or 
other instruments issued by the government, or part 
of an issue of stock, bonds or other instruments 
representing interests in or claims against any 
property or enterprise.2 
Model Penal Code §224.1 comment 8, reads in relevant part 
as follows: 
Under Subsection (2), forgery is a second-degree 
felony where the thing forged is or purports to be 
"part of an issue of money, securities, postage or 
revenue stamps, or other instruments issued by the 
government, or part of an issue of stock, bonds or 
other instruments representing interests in or 
claims against any property or enterprise." In 
such cases, the special dangers of forgery are most 
likely to be present. Fraud is likely to be 
perpetrated on a considerable scale; it takes 
special expertise in the main to reproduce these 
types of documents; and confidence in the 
authenticity of widely circulating instruments 
representing wealth will be undermined. There is 
no case today for distinguishing forgery of 
See State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 195 (Utah 1987)(absent "meaningful 
legislative history . . . we turn to the background and comments of [the] Model 
Penal Code"). 
2The Utah statute departs from the Model Penal Code including "checkfs] 
with a face amount of $100 or more" and instruments representing claims against 
"any person" in the definition of a second degree felony. The Model Code deals 
with the forgery of checks in the second sentence of Subsection (2) which reads: 
Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or 
purports to be a will, deed, contract, release, commercial 
instrument, or other document evidencing, creating, 
transferring, altering, terminating, or otherwise affecting 
legal relations. 
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corporate securities in this respect from 
government bonds or bank notes, and Subsection (2) 
accordingly treats them in the same manner. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 303. 
In the instant case, it is apparent that the evil which 
the State seeks to punish is adequately addressed by the theft 
statute. While the Defendant allegedly sought to conceal a theft 
by creating a false document, the concomitant forgery is, under the 
clear language of the forgery statute and like the theft itself, a 
class A misdemeanor.3 
POINT III 
DUE PROCESS MANDATES APPLICATION OF THE LESSER 
GRADE OF OFFENSE. 
In State v. Reed, 183 N.J. Super. 184, 443 A.2d 744 
(1982), the defendant went into a banking institution and forged 
the name of the owner of a savings account to a withdrawal slip in 
an attempt to withdraw $560. The teller realized that the 
defendant was not the depositor and called the police. 
On appeal from an order sentencing the defendant for 
forgery as a crime of the third degree, the New Jersey court 
unanimously held: 
Defendant forged a withdrawal slip. Third degree 
forgery is a writing which "purports to be part of 
an issue of money, securities, postage or revenue 
stamps, or other instruments, certificates or 
licenses issued by the government, or part of an 
issue of stock, bonds or other instruments 
representing interest in or claims against any 
3Cf. U.C.A. 76-6-412(1)(c) (theft of property having a value of more than 
$100 but not exceeding $250 is a class A misdemeanor). 
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property or enterprise." [Emphasis supplied by 
author of opinion.] We are satisfied that the 
withdrawal slip is not part of "an issue" of any of 
the items or instruments enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C: 
21-1 b. . . . 
Moreover, it is essential that the offense be 
explicitly delineated. Due process demands that 
penal statutes be strictly construed. [Citation 
omitted.] Thus, since the forgery of the 
withdrawal slip is not included in the language 
defining third degree crimes, it comes under the 
catchall provision, "otherwise," and is a fourth 
degree crime. Consequently, defendant is entitled 
to a reduction in sentence from five years to 18 
months on the forgery count. We so order. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 748-49. 
Applying similar principles, in State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 
2d 343, 346, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
The well-established rule is that a statute 
creating a crime should be sufficiently 
certain that persons of ordinary intelligence 
who desire to obey the law may know how to 
conduct themselves in conformity with it. A 
fair and logical concomitant of that rule is 
that such a penal statute should be similarly 
clear, specific and understandable as to the 
penalty imposed for its violation. 
Related to the doctrine just stated is the 
rule that where there is doubt or uncertainty 
as to which of two punishments is applicable 
to an offense an accused is entitled to the 
benefit of the lesser. [Emphasis added.] 
The facts of this case present a real and substantial 
question of whether the forgery of the subject document constitutes 
a felony of the second degree or a class A misdemeanor. This 
question should be resolved in favor of the Defendant. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of 
conviction should be reversed and the case remanded to the district 
court with instructions to reduce Defendant's conviction from a 
second degree felony to a class A misdemeanor. 
DATED this \^y- day of August, 1992. 
Mi 
Gary w. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I caused four true and exact 
copies of the within and foregoing docximent to be mailed to the 
Utah State Attorney General, Paul R. Van Dam at 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, on the 1^* day of August, 
1992. 
M 
Gary/ W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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